

FORUM: Security Council

QUESTION OF: The question of the increasing tension in the Persian Gulf

SUBMITTED BY:

CO-SUBMITTERS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

Recalling Human Rights Council Resolution 42/2 (A/HRC/RES/42/2; 2019), and the violation of international human rights law,

Deeply concerned by the usage of starvation as a method of warfare as detailed in Chapter V Section B Sub-Section 5 Article 56 of HRC Resolution 42/17 (A/HRC/42/17; 2019), in violation of Security Council Resolution 2417 (S/RES/2417; 2018) through Operation Decisive Storm (ODS), resulting in the land, sea, and air blockade of the Hudaydah port,

Noting with concern other violations of human rights resulting in unjust suffering inflicted on civilians, most notably the arbitrary killing thereof by sides of the conflict in Yemen, instances including but not limited to the supplication of the Mark 82 bomb resulting in the Dahyan Airstrike, and the Sana'a Funeral Airstrike,

Further recalling the violations of international law as specified in Chapter V of HRC Resolution 42/17, including but not limited to “violations related to the conduct of hostilities, [...] violations related to the humanitarian situation, [and] arbitrary killings, enforced disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment [committed by the] governments of Yemen, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia,” specified in articles 64-68,

Having noted the possible violations of the Geneva Conventions as delineated in the Annual report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) entitled the “Situation of human rights in Yemen, including violations and abuses since September 2014” (A/HRC/42/CRP.1; 2019), and possible war crimes detailed in HRC Resolution 42/17 (A/HRC/42/17; 2019),

Concerned that Iran’s President, Hassan Rouhani, has threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz, where 20% of global oil consumption is transported as this would have an extremely adverse impact on the world economy,

Aware of Security Council Resolution 2231 which endorses the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA),

Further aware of the illegal Iranian seizure of the Stena Impero and the detention of 23 crew members,

Supporting the European Union, France, Russia, China, United Kingdom and Germany in continuing to fulfill the obligations of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) by remaining as signatories to the deal,

Condemning the military operations of the delegations of the United States of America and Iran respectively conducted on January 3, 2020, and January 8, 2020, in Iraqi territory and further calls the delegations of the US and Iran to contribute to the peace and security in the Gulf Region,

Recognizing the false allegations against Nazanin Zaghari-Ratcliffe and her poor treatment by the Iranian State,

1. Calls on the governments of member nations situated in the Persian Gulf to:
 - a) remove bureaucratic impediments to flows of humanitarian supplies
 - b) ensure effective and sustained functioning of all ports, onward road access throughout the

country

- c) reopen and ensure the safe and secure operation of any airports for any and all necessary flights within an agreed mechanism;
2. Urges the Government of the United States of America to reconsider its stance on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) through a joint conference with the participation of the signatories of the JCPOA, Iran and the USA in order to pave the way for the discussion of the present state of the JCPOA and for participating delegations to express their concern in order to initiate the normalization of relations between the delegations of US and Iran and ensure the implementation of the JCPOA and S/RES/2231;
3. Calls upon the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (UNESCWA) to contribute to the ending of the Qatar blockade by Saudi Arabia, by putting together an impartial investigative team which will:
 - a) investigate each of the accusations by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Egypt and decide whether or not they are legitimate, accusations such as but not limited to Qatar:
 - i. financing and furthering extremist organizations in the region
 - ii. interfering in Egyptian internal affairs
 - b) review the thirteen demands made by the blockading nations and determine whether they are conducive to peace in the Persian Gulf
 - c) review whether any of the demands are infringing upon Qatar's sovereignty or rights
 - d) call a summit, once the aforementioned investigative team has come to a conclusion, to be attended by blockading nations and Qatar:
 - i. to be held in a neutral member state (e.g. Kuwait) that can be agreed upon by all involved nations
 - ii. where investigative teams' findings will be discussed, and in the case that any of the demands violates Qatar's sovereignty, it is removed or adjusted so that it satisfies all attending parties
 - iii. in which, if all parties are satisfied and Qatar is willing to implement the demands, that embargoes and sanctions are lifted, diplomatic ties with Qatar are reinstated, and alleged human rights violations against Qatari citizens in blockading nations are ceased immediately
 - e) propose to Qatar or other parties to refer the case to the ICJ if the summit mentioned in sub-clause (d) does not cause the desired results in sub-sub-clause (iii);
4. Encourages positive relations between member states and Iran to decrease tensions and maintain peace and stability in the region, through methods including, but not limited to:
 - a) instigating peace talks held in The Hague attended by the signatories, namely EU Members, P5 nations and all nations bordering the Persian Gulf to discuss issues including, but not limited to:
 - i. enabling the International Atomic Energy Agency to collaborate with the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran, allowing them to restrict the enrichment of uranium-235 to a safe amount
 - ii. keeping the Strait of Hormuz open to maintain the global economy
 - iii. the discontent surrounding the United States' withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
 - b) demanding that the United Nations launch an investigation into the party behind the destruction of merchant ships in the Gulf of Oman in May and June of 2019 to bring closure
 - c) ensuring the economic security within the region to stabilize trade, specifically oil exports and oil revenues to foreign states through cooperation with the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development;

5. Establishes the United Nations Persian Gulf Security Committee (UNPGSC) as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council operating in coordination with the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), with:
 - a) a mandate for:
 - i. joint air and naval operations
 - ii. intelligence sharing
 - iii. collaborative cyber-defense operations
 - b) a commitment to monthly reports to track and report:
 - i. vessel security measures
 - ii. planned or attempted attacks
 - iii. spending and resource allocation
 - iv. recommendations to the international community;
6. Further calls upon the UNPGSC to facilitate shipping insurance in the Persian Gulf by:
 - a) performing quantitative risk analyses on vessels and cargo, based on the methodology of the International Maritime Organisation's Formal Safety Assessment, and additionally evaluating the political value of the vessel to potential attackers using criteria including but not limited to:
 - i. the vessel's flag
 - ii. the cargo's port of origin and destination
 - iii. patterns in previously detected attacks
 - b) recommending the creation of an independent Coalition Insurance Framework (CIF) funded primarily by the sovereign investment funds of willing and able UNPGSC nations, which would:
 - i. insure only the part of the vessel's itinerary that transits through the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz, thus mitigating the 'war-risk premiums' that stem from this region
 - ii. take into account any UNPGSC patrol or protective mission during the risk evaluation of a vessel's voyage
 - iii. calculate and provide adjusted insurance rates and premiums on a per-vessel and per-voyage basis, according to the above stipulations;
7. Further calls on the UNPGSC to deploy its collective resources to defend civilian vessels in the Persian Gulf from both hybrid and conventional warfare by:
 - a) mine hunting, using the following steps:
 - i. mine detection using laser, acoustic, or magnetic means
 - ii. digital classification of detected object
 - iii. Identification by a diver or autonomous underwater vehicle
 - iv. retrieval of the mine for further analysis
 - b) extending naval escorts to at-risk vessels when deemed necessary according to the aforementioned risk evaluation, using vessels provided by UNPGSC navies with the following conditions:
 - i. a strict non-aggression mandate based on the tenets of UN peacekeeping missions
 - ii. constant communication with the UNPGSC command centre, rather than only sovereign militaries
 - iii. escorts which may enter the territorial waters only of UNPGSC nations
 - iv. escorts which may not extend into international waters in the Indian Ocean
 - c) bolstering accountability for attacks by:
 - i. equipping vessels with radio-frequency transmitters keyed to radio tower buoys positioned only in the Persian Gulf (thus trackable only in the Gulf), for GPS location to be sent directly to the UNPGSC rather than passing through states or corporations
 - ii. equipping vessels with cameras on deck, transmitted directly to the UNPGSC
 - iii. subjecting themselves to investigation by non-state UN auditors in case of

tampered or missing data

- d) identifying the chain of command behind potential or successful attacks, and the backers of non-state actors through:
 - i. forensic analysis of hostile equipment (such as mines, including smart mines which may bear ‘digital fingerprints’)
 - ii. The development of existing anti-terrorist collaborative efforts such as the INTERPOL-United Nations Security Council mission and its methodology in tackling large-scale terrorist organisations;

8. Further urges the gradual withdrawal of all foreign military personnel (hereinafter referred to as “foreign troops”) from Iraq in accordance with the demands of the Iraqi government and the requests of Iraqi Prime Minister Adel Abdul Mahdi and reaffirming Chapter I Article 2 Section 4 of the Charter of the United Nations, and the establishment of a temporary UN committee under the Secretary-General, named the United Nations Oversight Committee for Full Withdrawal from Iraq (OCFWI), which shall:

- a) be headquartered in the UN offices within the Green Zone of Baghdad, chiefly for the purpose of the ease of communication with the Embassy of the United States of America
- b) receive an initial mandate duration of three months, renewable twice by the UNSC, after which point the OCFWI shall be dissolved, and other necessary steps to assist in and incentivize the withdrawal of foreign troops shall be decided upon by the UNSC
- c) be managed by a special representative of the Secretary-General, appointed by the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations for the entire duration of the OCFWI’s mandate
- d) propose to the UNSC and the US Central Command (CENTCOM) within 10 days of its incorporation a three-month, three stage plan detailing to the greatest possible extent the specifications of and the time frames constructed for the application of the plan, wherein:
 - i. the three stages of the plan shall be proposed as the physical withdrawal stage, the political withdrawal stage, and the replacement stage
 - ii. the physical withdrawal stage shall encompass all logistical aspects of the withdrawal of foreign troops and other military staff, consisting of the bulk of OCFWI’s area of operations
 - iii. the replacement stage shall encompass the coordination of the takeover of UN-led operations of the role played formerly by foreign troops, specifically working to prevent the occurrence of a power vacuum
- e) cooperating to the fullest extent with CENTCOM, if necessary establishing a joint board tasked with informing the OCFWI of CENTCOM’s operations, allowing OCFWI personnel entry into and all other privileges provided to US Military staff by CENTCOM military bases and other facilities, and allowing for the free transfer of information and goods between the two entities, so as to ensure full transparency and bureaucratic efficiency in the conduction of the withdrawal operation
- f) oversee and help coordinate the withdrawal of foreign troops, reporting at the very least once every 15 days to the UNSC the current status of withdrawal, the amount and percentage of troops and staff withdrawn and currently remaining, and an action plan for the next 15-day period
- g) work in cooperation with and take all actions with the complete consent of the government of Iraq, establishing an office to communicate with the relevant legislative organs and/or other governmental entities of Iraq to maintain a robust line of communication, preventing bureaucratic inefficiencies
- h) aid primarily with the logistical aspects of the operation, if necessary supplying cargo planes, land, and naval transportation vehicles, escorts for land transportation vehicles operated by the US Army, utilizing whenever appropriate and possible the tools, equipment, expertise, staff, and troops of the United Nations Force for the Arabian Peninsula (UN-FAP), and/or funding for all necessities listed above, provided by the Secretariat whenever requested by the OCFWI;

9. Calls for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) to form a specialized commission working under the ICJ to oversee the implementation of ICJ Case named Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates) and to report the UAE's practice of the ICJ verdict to the UN Security Council and to the Secretary-General while reminding the obligation of the Member States to abide by the ruling of the ICJ according to Chapter XIV Article 94 of UN Charter;
10. Further calls for the establishment of two UN governed bodies:
 - a) the ICTI (International Criminal Tribunal for Iraq), in which:
 - i. one major court will be established, in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates
 - ii. the ICTI will have three jurisdictional requirements which must be met, in order for a case to proceed; Subject-matter jurisdiction, (genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, violations of the Geneva conventions); Territorial or personal jurisdiction (must be in Iraq); Temporal jurisdiction (functioning retroactively from the 23rd of October 2003)
 - iii. the ICTI will investigate and work harmoniously with the WCIAI (see sub-clause (b)) and, where warranted, will prosecute individuals and/or governments charged with crimes which fall under the aforementioned jurisdiction of concern to the people of Iraq, and any foreigners residing in Iraq from the 23rd of October 2003
 - iv. the office of the prosecutor will be divided into two sections, the investigatory section, which will be responsible for collecting evidence and implicating individuals and/or governments, and the prosecution section, which will be responsible for prosecuting and subjecting peoples to trials
 - v. an armed division of the court will be created, consisting of volunteers from the UN peacekeeping force to protect the court from terrorist or other hostile forces, given the fact that Iraq is a war zone
 - vi. if a trial has concluded, and an individual is proven guilty in absentia, it is under the mandate of the peacekeeping volunteers to conduct man hunts to search for the convict
 - vii. peacekeeping officers may also be sent into Iraq to help conduct such manhunts
 - viii. the court has the right to request an extradition from a foreign country should such a criminal be found guilty in absentia and the state reserves the right to refuse this extradition request
 - b) the WCIAI (War Crime Investigatory Agency in Iraq), which
 - i. will consist of 15 major posts situated across Iraq
 - ii. will act as an investigatory agency to conduct research and to collect evidence on suspected acts genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and violations of the Geneva conventions
 - iii. will work in harmony with the ICTI, more specifically the investigatory section, to conduct manhunts and field research as required
 - iv. will also function as a separate organization by which civilians in Iraq can bring forth incidents which they believe to fall under any of the criterion stated above for the WCIAI to investigate and potentially later bring to the ICTI;