

**FORUM:** General Assembly Fifth Committee (GA5)

**QUESTION OF:** Financing of the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO)

**SUBMITTED BY:** Vietnam

**CO-SUBMITTERS:** DR Congo, Fiji, Slovenia, Burundi, China, Somalia, Russia, Liechtenstein, African Union, Paraguay, Moldova, Romania, Niger, Gabon, Madagascar, Micronesia, Togo, Timor Leste, Kiribati, Gambia, Papua New Guinea, Marshall Islands, Benin

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

*Having considered* the point of view of various member states that the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) is not making proportionate progress with its allocated budget,

*Considering* correct strategic arrangement of an armed force as the primary step towards greater efficiency at a lower cost,

*Taking into account* local tensions within Congolese communities as a potential root of violence aside from ethnic animosity and competition over natural resources, as suggested by United Nations (UN) policy watchdog Global Policy Forum,

*Defining* "conflict minerals" as minerals extracted in a conflict zone that perpetuate the conflict by profiting the belligerents,

*Further defining* the "3TGs" as the minerals cassiterite, wolframite, coltan and gold ore, which are often extracted in great quantities in the east of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to perpetuate rebel groups' operations, becoming conflict minerals,

*Convinced* that worldwide demand for the 3TGs, combined with imperfect supply chains, is financing armed groups operating in the DRC at sizable amounts,

*Noting* taxation, as used by governments worldwide, as an effective method of counteracting the over-consumption of such goods with negative outside effects,

1. Asks MONUSCO and the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (FARDC) to keep inefficiency and indiscipline in their military operations at a minimum through:
  - a) a thoughtful designation of command, taking into account a military officer's knowledge of Congolese terrain and experience in commanding a certain type of unit
  - b) the organization of the command structure to allow distinct types of units to operate in a large group, where they are fit, and receive command independently from unfit units, examples of which include:
    - i. infantry in dense rainforests and mountains
    - ii. armored fighting vehicles in open areas
  - c) guaranteed communicational and operational consistency between cooperating peacekeepers, in their diversity, by ensuring
    - i. common military terminology, such as letter codes
    - ii. common strategies and common gestures to invoke certain actions
    - iii. the closest possible match of primary and secondary languages between peacekeepers in a given unit;
2. Asks the DRC and MONUSCO to become especially involved with violence at the local level and endeavor to stop its said parallel sources, by:
  - a) creating a special temporary judicial body to have authority over and settle disputes in conflict areas, with little to no burden placed on the losing side

- b) assigning surveyors to the DRC municipalities in question to discover all disputes that require direction to the said judicial body, paying attention to
    - i. conduct the surveys in the company of security forces
    - ii. clarify the authorities' intentions to the population surveyed and inform disputers about their special conditions and overall benefits, so as to reveal a maximum number of disputes
  - c) starting awareness programs regarding causes of violence not in the form of a dispute over a specific possession, such as blood feuds, that would not receive effective help by a court;
3. Strongly encourages contributor states to the MONUSCO to also provide jets and implement the incessant aerial surveillance of the DRC's vast mineral fields as an integral part of the peacekeeping mission, in order to:
- a) achieve a more seamless watch on mining activity in the region
  - b) allow peacekeeper forces/the FARDC on land to respond to a greater portion of mining activity unidentified by DRC authorities and any form of violence in eastern DRC, with shorter delay
  - c) thus help local communities thrive by
    - i. directing a greater portion of people, particularly children, from forced labor to productive activity
    - ii. boosting the rate of the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of members of rebel groups, otherwise their neutralization
  - d) thus bring about a faster collapse or large-scale weakening of armed groups, making a long-term profit in terms of MONUSCO expenditure
  - e) further use the jets in the dropping of informative leaflets about DDR on territory frequently troubled by armed group violence, containing information regarding the process and examples of past successes in order to inform and persuade armed rebels;
4. Hopes for a decrease in demand for the 3TGs, a major factor sustaining DRC rebel groups and peacekeeping expenditure, in an effort which all Member States can support, through:
- a) the taxation of purchases and imports of goods involving 3TGs, the amount depending on factors such as
    - i. difference in time from the previous purchase/import of the same category, so as not to target genuine need
    - ii. the condition of the good, which may signal a genuine need
  - b) advertisement campaigns, utilizing pathos, against luxurious consumption of the goods in question
  - c) the formulation of economic regulations and security measures to compel corporations within their borders to ensure that they source all 3TGs from responsibly chosen sources, so as to further minimize armed militias' revenue;
5. Proposes, in order to attract commitments of better-trained and equipped personnel to MONUSCO and UN peacekeeping missions in general from More Economically Developed Countries (MEDCs), benefits from taking part in the peacekeeping process to be created both by the UN and organizations linked to the UN, such as but not limited to:
- a) relatively generous interest rates and grants provided by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to a peacekeeping contributor state by the World Bank and WTO
  - b) exemption from compulsory economic policy changes, known as structural adjustment programs, as required by IMF loans known as structural adjustment programs, as required by World Bank or WTO loans
  - c) the right to vote, in addition to mere participation, during the discussion in the Security Council (SC) of an issue to which a non-SC peacekeeping contributor state is a party;
6. Recommends all Member States committing peacekeepers newly to MONUSCO to take precautions against their citizens' uninformed disagreement and stabilize their position through awareness

campaigns at home about the moral value and benefits of their assistance, but also remember to heed informed arguments;

7. Further proposes, in view of the decrease in demand for peacekeeping personnel from Less Economically Developed Countries (LEDCs) as a result of the satisfaction of clause 7's goal, alternative methods of sustaining former LEDC peacekeeping contributors' economic growth, such as:
  - a) low-interest credits and grants, without structural adjustment programs, provided by the World Bank (WB), the UN and the international community in order to boost quality of life in rural areas and prevent farmer migration to cities, building vital infrastructure such as schools and public transportation choices
  - b) further international assistance for the functioning of these services, in the form of other factors of production including equipment and trained employees
  - c) the constant analysis and development of their economic policies, with particular attention to gradual independence from the aid described in sub-clauses a and b, in tandem with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the World Trade Organization;
  
8. Strongly urges Member States and the WB to commit resources to strengthening the DRC in a way that will eventually enable the country to maintain law and order without external assistance, by:
  - a) developing FARDC training through
    - i. funding of army training equipment to be owned by the FARDC
    - ii. an increase in the number of expert military officers working with the FARDC, in order to train it with greater speed, frequency and quality until FARDC training at a high quality has become self-sustaining
  - b) equipping the FARDC with sufficient modern army equipment and vehicles
  - c) fostering the growth of the DRC's wealth, thus the country's ability to invest in itself, through
    - i. encouragement for the expansion of legal mining operations
    - ii. funding of mining tools and safety equipment to be owned by the Congolese government and national miners
    - iii. provision of security forces, as long as the development described in sub-clause a is uncompleted, dedicated to ensuring against armed militia raids
    - iv. subsidization of the DRC's conflict-free exports
  - d) promoting growth in the number of educated individuals in the DRC who can advance their country's prosperity with their future involvement, through
    - i. funding of the construction of educational institutions in the DRC, with priority for areas where access to education is most competitive
    - ii. provision of teachers and professors in Congolese educational institutions, who are willing to serve in exchange for danger pay.