

FORUM: Security Council

QUESTION OF: The threat of North Korea's nuclear arsenal

SUBMITTED BY:

CO-SUBMITTERS:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL,

Emphasizing that the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological military programs and their methods of delivery, can cause severe harm and constitutes as a threat of international peace and security,

Expressing its concern for the DPRK's nuclear weapons program have caused destabilization in the region and beyond, which determines the clear threat this issue has to international peace, security and stability,

Welcoming all efforts by NGOs including but not limited to the NTI, Arms Control Association, the International Atomic Energy Agency and more, which are aimed towards denuclearization, in order to save millions of lives,

Noting with satisfaction over recent progress in the denuclearization process of the DPRK, through increased numbers of negotiations and summits, and their halt of nuclear tests since September 3rd 2017,

Deeply disturbed by the DPRK and their proliferation of nuclear weapons to unstable regions of the world in exchange for hard currency, resulting in more areas of the world threatened by nuclear weapons programs,

Proclaims the necessity for the continuation of multilateral summits between the delegations of the United States of America, North Korea, and South Korea in order to achieve the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Korean Peninsula,

1. Strongly encourages all member states to commit to denuclearization by distancing all possibilities and instances of the DPRK creating additional nuclear arsenals through the implementation of specific international efforts such as:
 - a) the safe disposal of all items including uranium and plutonium that may be used to supply the DPRK's nuclear weapons program, furthermore, if a member state is found transferring such items to the DPRK, punishments including sanctions, fines, trade embargoes will be placed on the state
 - b) the implementation of a ban within the national government of all member states which would forbid all transnational corporations on supplying the DPRK with any items that would enhance their nuclear weapons program along with consequences of sanctions, fines and trade embargoes, if broken
 - c) the suggestion for the Security Council to alleviate diplomatic sanctions, sanctions on natural resources, humanitarian aid, food, whereas keeping the current status of arms embargo imposed on the DPRK with United Nations Security Council Resolutions unchanged due to the deteriorating effects of the sanctions against the previous diplomatic achievements of Singapore and Hanoi Summits in order to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Korean Peninsula;
2. Encourages the establishment of secure lines of dialogue with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) through methods such as:
 - a) prompting UN bodies such as the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) and the Secretariat as organizations with unbiased views to establish dialogues with the DPRK with the sole purpose of securing peace and report their findings and results to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA)

- b) continuing the Six-Party talks between the DPRK, the Republic of Korea (ROK), United States of America, Russian Federation, Japan, and China in order to reach a peaceful resolution on security concerns about nuclear warfare and come to agreements on the six prominent points of the convention including security guarantee from foreign parties
 - c) establishing direct phone lines between the leader of the DPRK and the leaders of the US, Japan, and the Republic of Korea;
3. Strongly requests the establishment of a commission under the Security Council as a subsidiary body with the definition of Article 29 of the Charter of the United Nations with the stated purpose of investigating the possibility of an international investigative body — either an organ of the UN or that of a UN-affiliated non-governmental organization (NGO) — gaining access into nuclear facilities operated by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), which shall be named the Inquiry Into an International Investigation Into the Nuclear Arsenal of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (IIII-NADPRK, “5I”), and which shall:
- a) be headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary General for Nuclear Affairs, and, at the request of the Security Council, have its general organizational structure be detailed in a report of the Secretary-General, which is to be written at most 60 days after 5I’s incorporation
 - b) be tasked mainly with investigating the statements by the government of DPRK indicating a possible allowance to international agencies to access their nuclear facilities
 - c) work in collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), and promote the investigation of DPRK’s nuclear production facilities and nuclear arsenal storage facilities by CTBTO investigators, in particular the Punggye-ri nuclear test site
 - d) submit to the Security Council a quarterly report on the status of its operations
 - e) be given a mandate until 30 January 2021
 - f) suggest that the security council slightly lessen sanctions if the commission finds the DPRK cooperative with the international investigative body;
4. Strongly demands that the “Conference on Facilitating the Entry into force of the CTBT” scheduled for September 2021 be convened with the primary purpose of modifying the aforementioned Annex 2, namely and most significantly through the removal of DPRK from the Annex:
- a) in recognition of the outdated criteria of inclusion in Annex 2, that being a Member State’s participation in the Conference on Disarmament (CD) of 1996, and possession of nuclear weapon production capabilities at the time of the Conference
 - b) for the purposes of ensuring the complete ratification and the taking-effect of CTBT, without the obstruction of DPRK for its own benefit;
5. Decides to extend the mandate of Panel of Experts, established pursuant to paragraph 26 of resolution 1874 (S/RES/1874) until 31 January 2021, modified in paragraph 29 of resolution 2094 (S/RES/2094), decides that this mandate shall apply also with respect to the measures imposed in resolutions 2270 (S/RES/2270), 2321 (S/RES/2321), 2356 (S/RES/2356), 2371 (S/RES/2371), 2375 (S/RES/2375), and 2397 (S/RES/2397), expresses its intent to review the necessity for the continuation of the imposition of the proposed sanctions and existence of the aforementioned mandate no later than 31 January 2022, and request the Panel of Experts to report on the imposed sanctions to the Security Council through the Secretary-General quarterly.